vip – article

Tight policies in surplus countries helped undo the gold standard, which is a lesson for the euro

CHRIS ROCK, a comedian, is a big fan of Oprah Winfrey, a television host and philanthropist. He recalls one of Ms Winfrey’s shows during which a woman confessed to her husband that she had frittered away $300,000 and as a consequence their home was about to be repossessed. “By the end of the show, it was all the guy’s fault,” a clearly impressed Mr Rock told David Letterman, another talk-show host. “He was apologising for not loving her enough—it was the greatest ‘Oprah’ of all time.”

This may seem an odd sort of blame-shifting. Yet reasoning of this kind is increasingly used to explain how spendthrift countries get into trouble. On this view America’s credit boom and bust owed as much to a savings glut in Asia as to laxity at home. A new paper* by Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley, and Peter Temin of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, adds a dash of subtlety and a generous slice of history to this sort of analysis. The authors examine the role of fixed exchange rates in booms and busts and draw parallels between the inter-war gold standard and contemporary schemes, such as the euro and China’s peg with the dollar. …

Austerity or stimulus? Some economists have much more extreme views than that

BY MOST people’s standards, George Osborne, Britain’s 39-year-old chancellor of the exchequer, is a fiscal hawk. In his first budget, announced in June, he promised to raise taxes and cut spending without flinching. As a result, Britain’s net public debt should peak at about 70% of GDP in March 2014. According to the Institute for Fiscal Studies, a think-tank, his spending proposals are even more mortifying than the hair shirt imposed on Britain in 1976 by the IMF.

But Mr Osborne’s efforts look dainty compared with the rigours some economists think necessary. For example, Christian Hagist and his colleagues at Freiburg University believe Britain’s fiscal condition is far worse than the official figures suggest. In 2005, a time of prosperity and tranquillity, the country’s “fiscal gap” already amounted to 505% of GDP, they calculate, almost 14 times its official net debt for that year. Mr Hagist is an exponent of “generational accounting”, a method pioneered by Larry Kotlikoff of Boston University, among others. Through this lens, the rich world’s public finances look dire indeed. Writing in the Financial Times last month, Mr Kotlikoff declared that America was in worse fiscal shape than Greece. …

Fear of renewed recession in America is overblown; so is some of the optimism in the euro area

SELDOM does the United States look at Europe with economic envy. The past few weeks, however, have been one of those rare phases. Concern about America’s stumbling recovery has been rising, just as anxieties about the euro area’s economy have faded. The dollar is the weakling among rich-world currencies (see article). But Americans should take a little heart: it is too soon to despair about their economy. And Europeans should show a little caution: it is too soon to be sure that theirs is firmly back on its feet.

Some forecasters believe that America’s disappointing GDP growth in the second quarter, 2.4% at an annualised rate, could be the start of a slide towards a second recession. One worry is jobs, or the lack of them. American business created only 71,000 in July, too few to match the growth in the population of those of working age and far too few to shorten the queue of unemployed noticeably. Unemployment is stuck at 9.5%, even though corporate America is flush with cash. Companies are still unhelpfully shy of hiring, preferring to squeeze yet more output from fewer people. …

Conventional economic models failed to foresee the financial crisis. Could agent-based modelling do better?

MAINSTREAM economics has always had its dissidents. But the discipline’s failure to predict the financial crisis has made the ground especially fertile for a rethink.

Critics tend to agree on what is wrong with current macroeconomic forecasting. A hearing of the House of Representatives Committee of Science and Technology on July 20th targeted the “dynamic stochastic general equilibrium” (DSGE) models used by the Federal Reserve and other central banks. The hearing aimed to “question the wisdom of relying for national economic policy on a single, specific model when alternatives are available.” The Institute for New Economic Thinking in New York, which had its inaugural conference in April, has attacked many of the assumptions, including efficient financial markets and rational expectations, on which these models are predicated. These assumptions were clearly too simplistic. But there is less agreement on what should replace the old ways. …

Looking at the dollar in the old-fashioned way

WHEN the Bretton Woods system was cracking in the early 1970s the price of a troy ounce of gold, in dollar terms, was raised in two steps from $35 to $42.22. This was, in effect, a devaluation of the dollar.

The authorities then still thought it worth expressing the shift in terms of bullion, rather than against another currency like the Japanese yen or French franc. In the 1930s Franklin Roosevelt had a specific policy of devaluing the dollar against gold, pushing the price from $20.67 to $35 in the belief this would push commodity prices (and thus farm incomes) higher and reduce the burden of debt service. …